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The question of whether Heidegger can help the 
animals is initially unsettling, even after I brush away 
the unbidden and disconcerting images of some 
Teutonic version of Dr. Doolittle. Heidegger is no 
animal welfare advocate, nor an ethical theorist, in any 
usual sense. Not only does he not write an ethics, but 
he seeks to call into question the whole project of 
articulating a rational ground for morality. He is critical 
of the metaphysical assumptions which underlie value 
theory as well as rights theory. He speaks of the thinker's 
and the poet's responsibility to listen to the call of Being, 
but not of concrete responsibilities toward other 
creatures. It would appear that Heidegger would have 
little to contribute in any conversation about what 
specific duties we have toward animals-whether we 
should eat them, kill them, domesticate them, and so 
on-or about, say, the relative moral standing of 
chickens and crustaceans. On the other hand, to the 
extent that philosophical reflection about ethics and 
animals invites radical questioning about the nature, 
foundation, and scope of ethical concern and a critical 
engagement with our basic assumptions about how we 
define ourselves in relation to the nonhuman world, 
Heidegger might have something interesting to say in 
a dialogue with environmental philosophers and even 
with animal rights theorists. The question becomes 
whether the sort of help Heidegger might offer is the 
sort of help animals should want. 
Bruce Foltz has argued that Heidegger might indeed 
be helpful, first in providing a critique of the violent hubris 
of technological modernity, which turns animals into 
commodities and expendable resources, and in suggesting 
an alternative possibility of what Foltz calls "ontological 
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humility in the face of the integrity of beings," a non-
dominating, nonmanipulative way of seeing and acting 
in the world which would let beings be what they are 
rather than bending them to our wills and reshaping them 
in our own image. In the following discussion, I'd like 
to raise several questions, both about the extent to which 
Heidegger's thought allows for a less destructive, more 
harmonious way of living with other beings in the world 
and about the extent to which Heidegger either thwarts 
or neglects the environmental relevance or radical 
practical implications of his own project. 
Heidegger's exposition of Gelassenheit (letting-be) 
describes a comportment of responsive listening and 
heedful concern which lets the other be truly other and 
present itself in its own terms and which does not define 
oneself as the center and end of all meaning and value. 
A number of scholars, more explicitly concerned than 
Heidegger with a human history of colonialism and 
racism, have suggested that letting-be might have 
salutary implications for how we relate to other persons. 
As Foltz has argued, this might be similarly true for 
our relations with animals. Such possibilities seem 
consistent with what Heidegger does say about dwelling 
and letting-be. At the same time, it is notable that his 
own examples of dwelling describe disclosive 
encounters with inanimate things-the bridge, the jug, 
the peasant shoes-or with places-the Black Forest 
farmhouse, Lake Constance-rather than encounters 
with living individuals, human or otherwise. It is true 
that animals may be part of the household, or live in 
the lake, but they are important not in their particularity 
but insofar as they are part of that "self-blossoming 
emergence" Heidegger names earth. 
Human beings who live authentically on the earth 
relate to the earth by saving it. This means not 
"mastering or subjugating the earth" but setting it "free 
in its own presencing" ("B uilding, Dwelling, Thinking," 
in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 150). As Foltz has 
suggested, this sort of saving need not rule out eating 
or domesticating other inhabitants. Further, what is 
preserved and heeded in these encounters is not the 
concrete being of another individual but the meaning 
of Being; what is disclosed is not the specificity of the 
other but a world, a horizon of meaning. At least on the 
basis of his own examples, Heidegger's thought seems 
more inclined to support an ethical concern for 
preserving the spirit of a place, as articulated by the 
architect Christian Norberg-Schulz, or perhaps an 
ecologically-minded concern for preserving woods or 
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marsh, rather than (necessarily) specific individuals 
which make up that place. In brief, it is not yet clear if 
Heidegger helps resolve any of the tensions between 
animal rights and deep ecology approaches or leaves 
us with the same questions. 
Another question,for Heidegger has to do with how 
letting-be is possible as a way of seeing and acting so 
long as technology holds sway, so long as our primary 
relation to other beings is one of domination and 
exploitative consumption. Heidegger is ambiguous 
here. Sometimes it seems as if letting-be belongs to 
some indefinite future, for which we can only wait; at 
other times it seems to be a possibility that is always 
already here, if only in momentary glimpses. 
Heidegger emphasizes the redemptive power of 
language and of art; for him it is the poets who can 
hear clearly through the business of technological life 
who we are to be, and who can disclose a more 
authentic way of being. Yet it is not obvious that only 
the poets can save us. Heidegger has been criticized 
here for elitism, as well as for a quirky and nationalistic 
sense of who counts as a "real" poet. Even if we grant 
that "poetic" art might be one way of disclosing an 
alternative way of being, it is not clear that it is the 
only way. Heidegger may neglect more prosaic, more 
praxical, more solidly embodied ways in which the 
world, and our place in it, become meaningful. 
Heidegger's concern with waiting for the poets leads 
him to overlook more humble, though radical, ways 
our experience can be transformed, in particular those 
moments when we are able to see the other as other. 
This is what lies at the heart of nonviolent resistance-
that hope for the moment when the oppressor recognizes 
the humanity of the victim. This is also the experience 
that lies at the heart of Leopold's land ethic. Ithas been 
pointed out that his articulation of the land ethic only 
really makes sense to the extent that we have read the 
rest of the book and taken the woodcock's, the oak tree's, 
the mountain's points of view seriously. Ifwe are willing 
to see the woodcock on its own terms-and see it not 
only as a creature with purposes of its own but also as a 
being that is wonderful and mysterious-we are more 
likely to grant its inclusion in the moral community. 
Werner Marx describes an analogous source ofmoral 
concern in the acknowledgement of our common 
mortality. As human, we are capable of being aware of 
our own finitude, of recognizing in the experience of 
others our own fragility and ultimate aloneness, and 
finding in this shared fragility a basis for compassion. 
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Admittedly, such experiences are a tenuous ground for 
an ethics with any persuasive prescriptive power. 
Heidegger as well as Marx decribe a possibility of non-
exploitative, lucid awareness ofother beings which may 
indeed involve respect, letting-be, and even compassion. 
Yet there are no guarantees, no certainties. There is always 
the stronger possibility of blindness or, even worse, 
banality. When we do see another being as an other, 
existing in its own way and for its own sake, not ours, it 
seems equally if not more likely that we respond with 
fear, contempt, and violence, rather than with respect and 
heedful concern. We may kill the bear because its 
otherness unnerves us; we may feel disgust at another's 
dying because we fear our own death; we may oppress 
and revile other people because their differences seem 
to threaten us. We are all too capable of seeing with love 
and wonder one moment and with callous indifference, 
or even viciousness, the next. Sara Ruddick describes 
this human ambivalence well in her work on maternal 
thinking, in that the ideal comportment of attentive love 
exists in dialectical tension with the willful inattention 
and manipulative control of false consciousness. So, 
while Heidegger does suggest an answer to the question 
ofhow we are to dwell in the world with others-namely, 
by letting-be-he does not take us very far with 
answering how we are to get from here to there and, 
especially, how to stay there. 
This brings us again to Foltz's question of whether 
Heidegger is wrong to reject human animality 
altogether, and whether it is necessary or desirable to 
see essential similarities between humans and other 
animals in order to consider animals as morally relevant 
in their own right. Heidegger insists on a radical 
difference between humans and animals in that we live 
temporally and can experience death as death. It is this 
ontological experience ofdeath which provides the basis 
for compassion in Werner Marx's phenomenological 
ethics and which, presumably, would not offer a ground 
for fellow-feeling with other animals. At the same time, 
Foltz is right to point out that in Heidegger's account, 
humans and animals (insofar as they are part of the 
earth) both participate in the disclosure and concealment 
of physis, and that it is this mutual participation which 
would allow us to recognize animals as part of a 
common world worthy of respect and care. Heidegger's 
descriptions of human dwelling on the earth describe 
an ontological reality in which humans are deeply rooted 
in a place and connected with the other, nonhuman 
elements of a place. Yet it would be a mistake to think 
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of this mutual participation in physis simply as some 
sortofecological solidarity. Nor is it clear to what extent 
this continuity between human and animal provides a 
compelling basis for moral concern, nor what specific 
moral choices would be implied. 
There is a sense in which Heidegger's presentation 
ofhuman being in the world is still overly disembodied. 
Heidegger is not concerned with how human history is 
intertwined with ecological histories nor with the ways 
in which ecological interactions (much less economic 
and political interactions!) might inform the specific 
ways in which we would dwell. And while it is true 
that his earlier accounts of the structure ofDasein and 
his later accounts of dwelling describe an embodied 
existence, they are still notably abstract and cerebral. 
Heidegger is concerned with death but not the 
physicality of death; he is not concerned with human 
existence as gendered existence; he is not concerned 
with the sensual, fleshly experience of the body, 
especially the experience of the body in pain. 
This is, I think, where Heidegger falls short as a 
source of help for animals, as well as for an interhuman 
ethics. I agree with Foltz that Heidegger's analysis of 
technology is valuable as a way of articulating what 
is horrifying about practices of "factory farming," as 
a way of naming the ontological violence that is 
involved, and as a way of recognizing that factory 
farming is part of a larger picture of how we relate 
technologically to other beings. It may not be enough 
to say that factory farming is wrong, but it is not 
enough either to name the ontological horror of 
technology without also naming suffering and 
injustice. In a now notorious, unpublished essay on 
technology from the late 1940's, Heidegger compared 
agribusiness to the Holocaust: 
Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, 
in essence the same as the fabrication of 
corpses in the gas chambers and concentration 
camps, the same as the blockades which 
starved out whole countries, the same as the 
fabrication ofhydrogen bombs. (Schirmacher, 
Technik und Gelassenheit, p. 25) 
Horror at the ontological violence of technology is 
not enough, and the potential for heedful concern and 
respect in letting-be may be far too fragile and subject 
to corruption. In Chaim Potok's novel The Chosen, 
Reb Saunders makes the hard choice of raising his 
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brilliant but initially cold son Danny in silence, so that 
in that silence, Danny might hear the pain of the world 
and so learn compassion. People, animals, the very 
earth cry out in pain. Such an awareness of the depths 
of injustice and attunement to the suffering of the 
world may provide the best and only hope, for the 
animals and for us. 
Errata 
The following corrections are to Professor 
Evelyn Pluhar's "Arguing Away Suffering: The 
Neo-Cartesian Revival," which appeared in the 
Winter 1993 number. 
1. The last sentence of the text (p. 39) should 
have been these two sentences instead: 
"The ad hominem fallacy is indeed to be 
avoided, but one cannot help wondering 
ifDescartes and his modem counterparts 
would have argued as they did had they 
not had such powerful incentives to deny 
nonhuman suffering, ranging from 
vivisection to theodicy. Most significant 
of all, perhaps, is their shared vision of 
human superiority, a vision thathas nailed 
many nonhlIDlans to the scientific cross." 
2. The following note should have been 
added to the very end of the text: 
"My thanks to the Institute of Arts and 
Humanistic Studies for funding a one-
course teaching release during the fall of 
1992. This manuscript was written 
during that time period." 
3. Footnote 43 (p. 40) should have read: 
"He cites studies claiming, e.g., thatopiates 
affect "the psychological context" of the 
brain rather ilian the nerve messages. We 
now know that opiates work by releasing 
neurotransmitters that bind with brain 
receptors. Significantly, all vertebrates 
share this physiological mechanism." 
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